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Abstract
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-
shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable e¤ort to
benchmark treatments with veriable e¤ort. In our experiment, the players en-
dogenously negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the contractibility
of the outcome plays a crucial role when e¤ort is a hidden action. If the outcome
is contractible, most players overcome the hidden action problem by agreeing on
incentive-compatible contracts. Communication is helpful, since it may reduce
strategic uncertainty. If the outcome is non-contractible, in most cases low e¤ort
is chosen whenever e¤ort is a hidden action. However, communication leads the
players to agree on larger wages and substantially mitigates the underprovision
of e¤ort.
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1 Introduction
Economic relationships are often governed by contracts. Research in contract
theory explores what contracts are optimally signed depending on the prevailing
information structure (see Hart and Holmström, 1987).1 In particular, much at-
tention has been devoted to moral hazardenvironments with post-contractual
informational asymmetries due to hidden action (where a partys action, e.g. an
e¤ort level, is unobservable) and hidden information (where a party obtains
private information about a state of the world, e.g. a realized prot level).2
Contract theory argues that under certain circumstances, suitable contracts can
overcome the hurdles posed by these informational asymmetries, while under dif-
ferent circumstances, hidden action and hidden information may lead to second-
best results which are inferior to the rst-best results that would be achieved
under symmetric information. In the present paper, we report about a labora-
tory experiment with 754 participants that was designed to capture the essence
of moral hazard theory. Our aim is to explore to what extent actual human
behavior is consistent with the contract-theoretic considerations.
Our paper builds on the important work by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
who have conducted the most prominent experiment featuring a hidden action
problem. In the canonical one-shot hidden action model, the agent chooses
an e¤ort level, which stochastically inuences the outcome (i.e., the principals
return). Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) have exogenously xed an outcome-
independent contract, since their goal was to study the psychological connections
between trust, guilt, communication, and cooperation. In contrast, we allow the
players to endogenously negotiate individual contracts. Following the contract-
theoretic approach, we compare treatments in which e¤ort is a hidden action
with benchmark treatments where e¤ort is veriable. Moreover, our treatments
vary in whether or not the outcome is privately known by the principal and
whether or not communication is possible.
1For comprehensive textbook expositions of contract theory, see La¤ont and Martimort
(2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
2Following Hart and Holmström (1987), in this paper we consider settings in which the
contractual parties are symmetrically informed when the contract is signed. While not all
authors use the same taxonomy, Hart and Holmström (1987, p. 76) refer to contract-theoretic
models in which there is symmetric information at the time of contracting as moral hazard
models, with the two subcategories hidden action and hidden information (sometimes
called hidden knowledge), following Arrow (1985). In contrast, models in which the agent
has precontractual private information are categorized under the heading of adverse selec-
tion.For experimental tests of adverse selection theory, see Asparouhova (2006), Cabrales et
al. (2011), and Hoppe and Schmitz (2013, 2015).
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Specically, in the rst part of our experiment we focus on the standard
hidden action setup in which the principals return is contractible. We study
four treatments. In two treatments, there is no communication, while in the
other two treatments, we allow for free-form communication. In each of the
two cases, we compare a treatment in which e¤ort is a hidden action with a
benchmark treatment in which e¤ort is veriable. In our experiment, the players
can negotiate a contract in an alternating o¤ers bargaining game.3 It turns out
that when the principals return is contractible and e¤ort is unobservable, the
players often overcome the hidden action problem by agreeing on incentive-
compatible contracts that correspond closely to theoretically optimal contracts.
When we compare our hidden action treatment with the benchmark treatment
in which e¤ort is veriable, then in the absence of communication we nd that
hidden action somewhat reduces the fraction of cases in which high e¤ort (i.e.,
the rst-best decision) is chosen. Yet, in the presence of communication the
chosen e¤ort levels do not di¤er signicantly when we compare the hidden e¤ort
and the veriable e¤ort treatments. Hence, we conclude that the welfare loss
due to hidden action that we observe in the absence of communication is mainly
driven by strategic uncertainty, which is reduced by communication.4
In the second part of our experiment, we conduct four additional treatments
in order to study the combination of hidden action (on the side of the agent) with
hidden information (on the side of the principal). Specically, these four treat-
ments correspond to the four treatments of the rst part except that only the
principal learns her return, such that outcome-contingent wages are no longer
feasible. Given that the principals return is non-contractible, contract theory
predicts that a second-best e¢ cient contract inducing low e¤ort will be signed
when e¤ort is a hidden action, while high e¤ort would be specied when e¤ort is
veriable.5 Indeed, while we nd that the vast majority of players sign contracts
specifying high e¤ort in the treatments in which e¤ort is veriable, low e¤ort
is the most frequently observed decision when e¤ort is a hidden action. In the
3In line with the theoretical analysis that Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1581) perform
in order to nd the wage that they x exogenously, we thus give both parties approximately
equal bargaining powers.
4Note that when e¤ort is a hidden action, the principal may feel uncertain about whether
the agent has understood that given an incentive-compatible contract, exerting high e¤ort will
be in the agents self-interest (while this is not a problem when e¤ort is veriable). Commu-
nication can reduce this strategic uncertainty.
5Combinations of hidden action (on the side of the agent) and hidden information (on the
side of the principal) such as the one explored here have been studied theoretically by Schmitz
(2002) and Aghion et al. (2012, section V).
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absence of communication, high e¤ort is extremely rare when e¤ort is a hidden
action. In by far most cases, the players do not agree on high wages which
might give reason to expect high e¤ort in the presence of distributional fair-
ness preferences or positive reciprocity. In line with Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), communication in the form of promises increases the fraction of high
e¤ort signicantly, which may be explained by guilt aversion. While they have
shown that for an exogenously xed (large) wage, communication increases the
occurrence of high e¤ort, we complement their results by showing that commu-
nication increases the wages that the parties negotiate in the rst place.6 Yet,
given that the principals return is non-contractible, low e¤ort remains the most
frequent decision even when free-form communication (before and during the
negotiations) is possible.
Taken together, standard contract theory assuming risk-neutral preferences
correctly predicts the most frequently chosen e¤ort level in all of our eight treat-
ments. However, in particular with regard to the e¤ects of communication, the
experimental results also illustrate that it is desirable to enrich contract theory
in order to embrace a broader range of human behavior.
Related literature. Contract theory is devoted to incentive problems caused
by some form of private information. Hence, contract-theoretic models are no-
toriously di¢ cult to test using eld data, because by denition we do not have
access to unobservable variables.7 For this reason, as has also been pointed out
by Landeo and Spier (2009, 2012) and Huck et al. (2011), conducting controlled
laboratory experiments is a particularly useful way to directly test contract-
theoretic models.8
Our experiment is based on the pioneering work by Charness and Dufwenberg
6Recently, Brandts et al. (2016) have also studied the impact of communication on the
design of endogenously negotiated contracts, albeit in a very di¤erent context. Building on
Hart and Moore (2008), they consider the choice between rigid and exible contracts in a
setting with symmetric information. Yet, they already point out that it is also important
to explore the power of communication in contract design in environments with asymmetric
information, which is what we do in the present paper.
7For empirical evidence supporting the basic premise of contract theory that people do
respond to monetary incentives, see e.g. the studies by Lazear (2000), Paarsch and Shearer
(2000), Shearer (2004), and the earlier literature survey by Prendergast (1999). See also the
recent work by DellaVigna and Pope (2017), who have shown that even small piece rates are
more e¤ective than many academic experts had predicted. Note that these papers do not
study principal-agent games where contracts are endogenously chosen.
8In their experiments, Landeo and Spier (2009, 2012) have investigated the e¤ects of exclu-
sive dealing contracts, while Huck et al. (2011) have explored incentives provided by deferred
compensation.
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(2006), who have studied a one-shot principalagent game designed to capture
the essence of hidden action as treated in contract theory (p. 1594). The
starting point of their paper is a standard moral hazard problem with binary
e¤ort and binary return; i.e., they consider the simplest possible setup that
incorporates hidden action.9 Since Charness and Dufwenbergs (2006) study
is the most prominent experiment based on a hidden action problem so far,
we have used their numerical specication to facilitate the comparison of the
experimental results. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1582) point out that
they deliberately do not consider the usefulness of contracts that make the
wage contingent on the principals return.Instead, they theoretically derive a
contract that would be optimal when e¤ort was veriable and they exogenously
x this outcome-independent wage in order to show that non-binding preplay
communication fosters cooperation, which can be explained by guilt aversion.
Our paper is complementary to their work, as we let the players endogenously
design a contract. We allow the agents e¤ort decision to be a hidden action
and/or the outcome to be the principals hidden information, and we compare
the ndings to benchmarks where e¤ort and/or outcome are veriable.
Keser and Willinger (2000, 2007) have also conducted experiments in which
e¤ort is a hidden action. They allow for outcome-contingent wages and their
main results are that the agents wage typically covers his e¤ort costs, the wage
is larger if the good outcome is realized than if the bad outcome is realized,
and the principal does not get less than half of the total surplus. Both the
experimental setup and the focus of their work are di¤erent from our paper.
In particular, they do not consider any of the three treatment variations that
we study (veriable vs. hidden action, contractible vs. non-contractible outcome,
communication vs. no communication). Since they do not consider treatments in
which e¤ort is veriable, their experiments do not isolate the e¤ects that the un-
observability of e¤ort has, which contrasts with the contract-theoretic approach
that is focused on the question what consequences informational asymmetries
have compared to situations with symmetric information. Moreover, recall that
according to contract theory, the e¤ects of e¤ort unobservability crucially de-
pend on whether or not the outcome is contractible (i.e., whether or not the
principal has private information about her return). The present paper seems
9As has been emphasized by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1582), by denition a
hidden action problem requires a stochastic relationship between e¤ort and return: If, by
contrast, outcomes were perfectly correlated with the e¤ort choice, then the agents choice
could arguably be inferred once the payo¤s were realized. This would render the unobserv-
ability interpretation implausible.
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to be the rst experimental test of this prediction.
Finally, it should be noted that our experiment is complementary to the
important and inuential experimental literature on gift-exchange (cf. Fehr et
al., 1993, Brown et al., 2004, and the literature survey by Fehr et al., 2009). The
focus of this literature is quite di¤erent, since gift-exchange experiments usually
consider situations in which by assumption incentive contracts cannot be used,
while we study how people adapt the design of incentive contracts to variations
of the environment. In the gift-exchange literature, there is a deterministic
relationship between e¤ort and outcome, such that the principal can observe the
agents e¤ort decision.10 In contrast, following the contract-theoretic approach,
we study situations in which the agents e¤ort is a hidden action and compare
them to benchmarks where the e¤ort decision is veriable.11
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we present the contract-theoretic analysis of the hidden action
problem that motivates our experimental study. The experimental design is
introduced in Section 3 and predictions are stated in Section 4. In Section 5,
we present and analyze our experimental results. Concluding remarks follow in
Section 6. In the Appendix, we present further results concerning the contract
negotiation stage and we provide some examples of the messages sent by the
experimental subjects in the treatments with communication.
2 The theoretical framework
Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we consider two risk-neutral parties,
party A (the principal) and party B (the agent), who contemplate forming a
partnership in which a project can be carried out. If no contract is signed, the
project is not carried out and each party gets its outside option payo¤ of 5.
If the partnership is formed, then the agent can make a binary e¤ort decision,
10Brown et al. (2004) have shown that gift-exchange is not very powerful in one-shot encoun-
ters, even when e¤ort is observable. However, it should be noted that when communication
is possible, we nd some evidence for gift-exchange behavior even in our more challenging
environment where e¤ort is a hidden action (see Section 5.2.5 below).
11Note that there are also contract-theoretic models in which action and/or outcome are
observable by the contractual parties, yet unveriable by third parties such as the court.
While contract theorists such as La¤ont and Martimort (2002) usually do not subsume this
information structure under the heading of moral hazard, it plays a central role in the literature
on the hold-up problem, where contracts are by assumption incomplete and renegotiation
cannot be prevented (see Hart, 1995; cf. also Hoppe and Schmitz, 2011, for an experimental
study).
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e 2 f0; 1g. The agents e¤ort costs are 4e. The project can have two outcomes,
yielding either a high or a low revenue for the principal. Specically, if the agent
exerts high e¤ort (e = 1), then with probability 5=6 the principals revenue is
26, while with probability 1=6 the principals revenue is 14. If the agent exerts
low e¤ort (e = 0), then the principals revenue is 14.
Note that the expected total surplus is 20 if high e¤ort is exerted, 14 if low
e¤ort is exerted, and 10 if no partnership is formed.12 Hence, the rst-best
solution is achieved if the partnership is formed and high e¤ort is exerted.
Suppose rst that the agents e¤ort decision is veriable and the projects
outcome is contractible.13 The contract can then specify an e¤ort level that
the agent must choose and a wage depending on the projects outcome. Let
w1 denote the wage if the outcome is good (i.e., if the principals revenue is 26),
and let w0 denote the wage if the outcome is bad (i.e., if the principals revenue
is 14). Hence, the principals expected payo¤ is
uA(w1; w0; e) = e

5
6
(26  w1) + 1
6
(14  w0)

+ (1  e) (14  w0)
and the agents expected payo¤ is
uB(w1; w0; e) = e

5
6
w1 +
1
6
w0   4

+ (1  e)w0:
In line with Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1581), we suppose that both
parties have the same bargaining power, so the outcome of their contract ne-
gotiations is given by the regular Nash bargaining solution. Hence, the parties
agree on e = 1 and w1 = 845   15w0, such that both partiesexpected payo¤ is
10. Note that the optimal contract (e = 1; w0; w1 = 845   15w0) is not unique.
As long as e¤ort is veriable, the parties still implement the rst-best solution
when the outcome is not contractible such that w0 = w1 must hold (i.e., when
the principal has private information about her revenue). In this case, the parties
agree on the contract (e = 1; w0 = w1 = 14).14
However, when e¤ort is unobservable, the contractibility of the outcome is
decisive for whether or not high e¤ort is implementable.
12Throughout, we adopt the convention that total surplusrefers to the gross total surplus
(i.e., we do not subtract the outside option payo¤s).
13Note that contractibility of the outcome means that the agents wage payment can depend
on the realized return. Veriability of the e¤ort means that the e¤ort level can be directly
specied in the contract (as in Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, footnote 5) since it can be
enforced by court (see e.g. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 4).
14In their paper, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1581) exogenously x the contract
w0 = w1 = 14, which has been derived under the assumption that e¤ort is veriable.
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Specically, if e¤ort is unobservable (i.e., it is a hidden action) but the out-
come is contractible, a contract consists of the wages w1 and w0. According
to standard contract theory, if the parties want to implement high e¤ort, the
contract must then satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint
uB(w1; w0; 1)  uB(w1; w0; 0);
which can be rewritten as w1  w0 + 245 . Observe that the optimal contract
(w0; w1 =
84
5
  1
5
w0jw1  w0 + 245 ) still is not unique. An optimal contract
induces the agent to choose high e¤ort and yields expected payo¤s of 10 for
both parties. Thus, given risk-neutrality and contractible outcomes, the fact
that the agents e¤ort is unobservable does not pose a problem.
Yet, if e¤ort is unobservable and the outcome is not contractible such that
w0 = w1 must hold, the incentive compatibility constraint cannot be satised.
Hence, in this case the parties will agree on the contract w0 = w1 = 7 and the
agent will choose low e¤ort only, so the payo¤s of both parties are 7.
3 Experimental design
Our experiment consists of eight treatments. In each treatment, half of the
participants in each session were randomly assigned to the role of principals
and the others to the role of agents. Each treatment was run in three to four
sessions. No subject was allowed to participate in more than one session. In
total, 754 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were students of
the University of Cologne from a wide variety of elds of study.15 All interactions
were anonymous; i.e., no subject knew the identity of its partner.
Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), each session consisted of a one-
shot interaction; i.e., there were no repetitions and this was known to the sub-
jects.16 At the beginning of each session, written instructions were handed out
to each subject.17 Before the experiment started, each subject had to answer
15The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with zTree (Fischbacher,
2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
16Many other experiments with free-form communication also use pure one-shot designs (see
e.g. Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004a,b; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011). The players could
easily recognize their partner from earlier communication if random matching was used. When
a perfect stranger matching protocol is used, only very few rounds could be implemented if
we want to ensure a reasonably large number of independent observations. However, in future
research it may also be interesting to conduct experiments explicitly focused on learning in a
moral hazard context.
17The instructions for all treatments are in the Supplementary Material.
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several comprehension questions. A session lasted between 45 and 60 minutes.
We made use of the experimental currency unit ECU. At the end of each session,
the playerspayo¤s were converted into euros. The minimum, median, maxi-
mum, and average prots made in the experiment are 5, 12.92, 26.78, and 13.44
euros, respectively, including a 5 euros show-up fee.
In the instructions of the experiment, we used a neutral wording in line with
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). Specically, the players were called A and B
(instead of principal and agent), high e¤ort was referred to as rolling a die
and low e¤ort was referred to as not rolling a die.
Each treatment consisted of two stages, a contract negotiation stage and a
contract execution stage. In the contract negotiation stage, we implemented an
alternating o¤ers bargaining game. Specically, player A rst makes a contract
o¤er to player B. Player B can then react in three ways. He can accept the
o¤er such that the contract execution stage is reached, he can reject the o¤er
and terminate the contract negotiations such that both players obtain their
outside option payo¤s, or he can reject the o¤er and make an alternative contract
o¤er. In the latter case, the second round of the contract negotiation stage is
reached and player A can analogously react to player Bs o¤er in the three ways
just outlined. In particular, if player A rejects player Bs o¤er and makes a
countero¤er, the third round of the contract negotiation stage is reached, where
it is again player Bs turn to react in one of the three ways, and so on. According
to standard theory, the alternating o¤ers bargaining game has a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium that converges to the regular Nash bargaining solution when
the partiesdiscount factor  < 1 goes to one (see Rubinstein, 1982). Specically,
in our experiment subjects obtained 0:99R euros per ECU, whereR is the number
of rounds that the negotiation stage lasted. This way of converting ECU into
euros gave the subjects an incentive to nish the negotiations in early rounds
and it approximately balances their bargaining powers.18
In the contract execution stage, if the action rollis chosen, the computer
randomly draws a number out of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with equal probabilities. The
outcome that corresponds to a successful project occurred if the die came up
2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. If the die came up 1 or in case of the action dont roll, the
outcome corresponds to an unsuccessful project.
We employed a 2x2x2 design. In particular, the treatment variations refer
to whether the action is veriable or hidden, whether the outcome is contractible
18According to standard theory, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the alternating o¤ers
bargaining game the parties reach an agreement in the rst round, and given a discount factor
of  = 0:99, party B gets =(1 + ) = 49:7% of the pie.
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or not, and whether communication is possible (see Table 1).
Outcome is contractible
Agents e¤ort is a hidden action Agents e¤ort is a veriable action
No communication HA VA
Free-form communication HAC VAC
Outcome is not contractible
Agents e¤ort is a hidden action Agents e¤ort is a veriable action
No communication HA  VA 
Free-form communication HA C VA
 
C
Table 1. The eight treatments. HA and V A refer to hidden action and veri-
able action, respectively. The subscript indicates whether or not communication
is possible, while the superscript indicates whether or not the outcome is con-
tractible.
Hidden action treatment HA. In the hidden action treatment a contract o¤er
consists of two numbers X and Y , which correspond to the wages w0 and w1
in the theoretical framework.19 If in the contract negotiation stage one player
terminates the negotiations, then both players get their outside option payo¤s of
5. If a contract o¤er is accepted, then the contract execution stage is reached, in
which player B decides between rolland dont roll.Player A cannot observe
player Bs decision. If player B chooses roll,then with probability 5=6 player
As payo¤ is 26  Y and player Bs payo¤ is Y   4, while with probability 1=6
player A obtains 14 X and player B obtains X 4. If player B chooses dont
roll,player As payo¤ is 14 X and player Bs payo¤ is X.
Veriable action treatment V A. In the veriable action treatment, a contract
o¤er either consists of the action roll and two numbers X and Y , or of the
action dont roll and a number Z. If in the contract negotiation stage one
player terminates the negotiations, then both players get their outside option
payo¤s of 5. If a contract o¤er is accepted, then the contract execution stage is
reached. If the accepted contract prescribes the action roll,then with proba-
bility 5=6 player As payo¤ is 26  Y and player Bs payo¤ is Y   4, while with
19In each treatment, the wages had to be integers and they had to be chosen such that the
contract could not lead to a loss for any player.
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probability 1=6 player A obtains 14   X and player B obtains X   4. If the
accepted contract prescribes the action dont roll,player As payo¤ is 14  Z
and player Bs payo¤ is Z.
Hidden action with non-contractible outcome treatment HA . In theHA  treat-
ment, a contract o¤er consists of a number X. If in the contract negotiation
stage one player terminates the negotiations, then both players get their outside
option payo¤s of 5. If a contract o¤er is accepted, then the contract execution
stage is reached, in which player B decides between roll and dont roll.
Player A cannot observe player Bs decision. If player B chooses roll, then
with probability 5=6 player As payo¤ is 26 X and player Bs payo¤ is X   4,
while with probability 1=6 player A obtains 14 X and player B obtains X  4.
If player B chooses dont roll,player As payo¤ is 14 X and player Bs payo¤
is X.
Veriable action with non-contractible outcome treatment V A . In the V A 
treatment, a contract o¤er either consists of the action rolland a number X,
or of the action dont roll and a number Z. If in the contract negotiation
stage one player terminates the negotiations, then both players get their outside
option payo¤s of 5. If a contract o¤er is accepted, then the contract execution
stage is reached. If the accepted contract prescribes the action roll,then with
probability 5=6 player As payo¤ is 26 X and player Bs payo¤ is X  4, while
with probability 1=6 player A obtains 14 X and player B obtains X 4. If the
accepted contract prescribes the action dont roll,player As payo¤ is 14  Z
and player Bs payo¤ is Z.
Communication treatments HAC, V AC, HA C, V A
 
C. These treatments are
identical to the corresponding treatments described above, except that before
the beginning of the contract negotiation stage player A and player B could send
each other free-form text messages, and in the contract negotiation stage a player
could always add a free-form text message to his contract o¤er.20 Note that we
allow for free-form communication both before the negotiations and while the
negotiations are taking place in order to give communication a maximum chance
of being e¤ective.21
20A text message could contain up to 500 characters. The participants were not allowed to
reveal their identity through the messages.
21See also Charness and Dufwenberg (2010), who have pointed out that free-form commu-
nication can be more e¤ective than more restricted forms of communication.
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4 Predictions
According to standard contract theory, when all subjects are risk-neutral the
predictions are very clear, as has been explained in Section 2. If e¤ort is veri-
able, the players will always agree on high e¤ort. In contrast, if e¤ort is a hidden
action, high e¤ort will be implemented if and only if the outcome is contractible,
while low e¤ort will be chosen otherwise. In particular, if e¤ort is a hidden action
and the outcome is contractible, the players will agree on incentive-compatible
contracts. Communication has no impact on these predictions, since words alone
cannot change the payo¤s.
Yet, recall that the results predicted by standard theory assume that it is
common knowledge that all parties behave in a rational and prot-maximizing
way. While in the light of previous experimental results we do not expect that all
subjectsbehavior will strictly adhere to these assumptions, we hypothesize that
in each treatment in the majority of cases the actual e¤ort level will correspond
to the predicted one.
With regard to comparisons of the expected total surplus levels between the
di¤erent treatments, under the assumption of risk-neutrality standard theory
would lead to the following hypotheses.22
Hypothesis 1. Hidden action versus veriable action.
(i) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between HA and V A.
(ii) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between HAC and V AC .
(iii) The expected total surplus levels are smaller in HA  than in V A .
(iv) The expected total surplus levels are smaller in HA C than in V A
 
C .
Hypothesis 2. Contractible outcome versus non-contractible outcome.
(i) The expected total surplus levels are larger in HA than in HA .
(ii) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between V A and V A .
(iii) The expected total surplus levels are larger in HAC than in HA C .
(iv) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between V AC and V A C .
Hypothesis 3. Communication versus no communication.
(i) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between HA and HAC .
(ii) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between V A and V AC .
22Note that the total surplus level depends both on whether or not the parties agree on a
contract and on the chosen e¤ort level if a contract is signed. In Section 5, we will also present
tests for the e¤ort decisions given that a contract was signed. Moreover, we will study in detail
the agentschosen e¤ort levels for given contracts and whether or not incentive-compatible
contracts are written, even though here for brevity we do not present formally all hypotheses
that follow from the analysis in Section 2.
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(iii) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between HA  and HA C .
(iv) The expected total surplus levels do not di¤er between V A  and V A C .
While the canonical hidden action problem is a cornerstone of contract the-
ory, we are not aware of any previous experimental work that directly tests the
e¤ects of e¤ort veriability (Hypothesis 1) or the e¤ects of outcome contractibil-
ity (Hypothesis 2). With regard to Hypothesis 3, as has been explained in the
Introduction, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) have studied the e¤ects of com-
munication in a hidden action framework; yet, they did so for an exogenously
xed (outcome-independent) contract.
Thus, we are interested in investigating which contracts subjects negotiate
depending on the veriability of the e¤ort, the contractibility of the outcome,
and whether or not free-form communication is possible. Specically, is outcome
contractibility indeed essential to incentivize agents to exert unobservable e¤ort?
Or are behavioral forces such as reciprocity and guilt aversion so strong that high
e¤ort will be chosen even if the outcome is non-contractible and e¤ort is a hidden
action, in particular when communication is possible?23 Do the subjects always
agree on high e¤ort when e¤ort is veriable, or are risk-aversion and (in the case
of non-contractible outcomes) ex post inequity aversion so strong that low e¤ort
may be preferred?
5 Results
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics
This section summarizes our central results. Table 2 shows the main descriptive
statistics of our eight treatments. Observe that in each treatment the most fre-
quently chosen e¤ort level corresponds to the one predicted by standard contract
theory given risk-neutrality.
23In particular, given Charness and Dufwenbergs (2006) insights, we might expect a larger
total surplus in HA C than in HA
 . Note that standard theory predicts a wage of 7 in these
two treatments, while Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) exogenously xed the wage 14. It is
therefore interesting to nd out what wage the parties will actually agree on when they are
allowed to negotiate the contract endogenously.
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HA V A HAC V AC
High e¤ort 28=46 = 60:9% 38=47 = 80:9% 38=47 = 80:9% 41=47 = 87:2%
Low e¤ort 15=46 = 32:6% 6=47 = 12:8% 9=47 = 19:1% 5=47 = 10:6%
No contract 3=46 = 6:5% 3=47 = 6:4% 0=47 = 0% 1=47 = 2:1%
Mean of exp. total surplus 17.39 18.60 18.85 19.15
Mean of principalsexp. prots 9.07 9.78 9.49 9.83
Mean of agentsexp. prots 8.32 8.82 9.36 9.32
Mean of principalsexp. prots (high e¤.) 10.76 10.65 10.27 10.20
Mean of agentsexp. prots (high e¤.) 9.24 9.35 9.73 9.80
Mean of principalsprots (low e¤.) 6.73 6.67 6.22 7.80
Mean of agentsprots (low e¤.) 7.27 7.33 7.77 6.20
Mean number of rounds 1.83 2.02 1.30 1.60
HA  V A  HA C V A
 
C
High e¤ort 3=47 = 6:4% 33=47 = 70:2% 19=48 = 39:6% 31=48 = 64:6%
Low e¤ort 37=47 = 78:7% 11=47 = 23:4% 28=48 = 58:3% 13=48 = 27:1%
No contract 7=47 = 14:9% 3=47 = 6:4% 1=48 = 2:1% 4=48 = 8:3%
Mean of exp. total surplus 13.79 17.96 16.29 17.54
Mean of principalsexp. prots 6.51 10.74 8.15 9.94
Mean of agentsprots 7.28 7.21 8.15 7.60
Mean of principalsexp. prots (high e¤.) 10.33 12.48 11.26 11.87
Mean of agentsprots (high e¤.) 9.66 7.51 8.74 8.13
Mean of principalsprots (low e¤.) 6.49 7.09 6.14 6.85
Mean of agentsprots (low e¤.) 7.51 6.91 7.86 7.15
Mean number of rounds 2.43 3.28 1.67 1.65
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. All prots are in ECU.
In particular, consider rst the upper half of Table 2, where the outcome is
contractible. If e¤ort is a hidden action, nearly all players agree on a contract
and the majority of the agents subsequently choose high e¤ort. If e¤ort is
veriable, by far most players agree on a contract that species high e¤ort.24
Next, consider the lower half of Table 2, where the outcome is non-contractible.
If e¤ort is a hidden action, the vast majority of players agree on a contract and
subsequently low e¤ort is the most frequent decision of the agents. In contrast,
24However, note that even when e¤ort is veriable, the parties do not always agree on
choosing high e¤ort. Hence, it is clearly important to conduct benchmark treatments with
veriable e¤ort if we want to isolate the consequences of the unobservability of e¤ort in moral
hazard problems.
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if e¤ort is veriable, most players agree on a contract that species high e¤ort.
Observe that these results hold regardless of whether or not communication is
possible.
Table 2 also shows the means of the expected total surplus levels. Recall
that the expected total surplus is 20 if high e¤ort is chosen, the total surplus
is 14 if low e¤ort is chosen, and 10 if no contract is signed.25 Moreover, Table
2 displays the means of the principalsand agents (expected) prots as well as
the principalsand agents(expected) prots given high and given low e¤ort.26
Finally, the table also indicates for each treatment the mean number of rounds
that the contract negotiation stage lasted.27
While in each treatment the most frequently chosen e¤ort level corresponds
to the theoretically predicted one, Table 2 also illustrates that in some cases
there are large deviations from the point predictions. However, we are primarily
interested in comparisons between the treatments in order to nd out whether
the treatment variations have the predicted e¤ects. Thus, in the next subsection
we will present formal tests of the hypotheses derived in Section 4. We will then
have a closer look at the deviations from theory in Section 5.2 below.
5.1.2 Hypotheses tests
Let us now study the implications of the veriability of e¤ort, the contractibility
of the outcome, and the possibility of communication. Tables 3, 4, and 5 show p-
values for pairwise comparisons between our treatments.28 Regarding the e¤ect
of the e¤orts veriability, we nd support for three of the four predictions
made in Hypothesis 1. Specically, consider rst the case where outcome is
contractible (see the rst two columns of Table 3). In line with Hypothesis 1(ii)
the expected total surplus levels do not di¤er signicantly if communication is
possible. However, in the absence of communication the expected total surplus
levels are signicantly smaller if the action is hidden, which is in contrast to
Hypothesis 1(i). Next, consider the case of non-contractible outcomes. In line
25Note that in case of high e¤ort we take the expected values instead of the realized random
numbers drawn by the computer.
26Recall that the principalsand agents (expected) prots always add up to 20 given that
high e¤ort is chosen and to 14 given that low e¤ort is chosen. Hence, in Tables 3, 4, and 5
below, for a given e¤ort level the pairwise comparisons between the principalsprots lead to
the same p-values as the comparisons between the agentsprots.
27For more detailed results on the contract negotiation stage, see Appendix A.
28Throughout, we use two-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests in the case of surplus levels, prots,
and wages, while we use two-tailed Fisher exact tests in the case of categorical data.
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with Hypotheses 1(iii) and 1(iv), regardless of whether or not communication is
possible, the expected total surplus levels are signicantly smaller if the action
is hidden, compared to the case where the action is veriable.
With regard to the e¤ects of the outcomes contractibility, in line with Hy-
potheses 2(i) and 2(iii), when e¤ort is a hidden action, the expected total surplus
levels are larger when the outcome is contractible (regardless of whether or not
communication is possible). The di¤erences are highly signicant (see Table 4).
In line with Hypothesis 2(ii), the outcome contractibility does not signicantly
a¤ect the expected total surplus levels when e¤ort is veriable and there is no
communication. However, in contrast to Hypothesis 2(iv), in the presence of
communication and a veriable e¤ort decision, the expected total surplus lev-
els are signicantly larger when outcome is contractible than when outcome is
non-contractible.
Now consider Table 5, which shows the e¤ects of communication. In line
with Hypotheses 3(ii) and 3(iv), communication has no signicant e¤ects on the
expected total surplus levels when e¤ort is veriable (regardless of whether the
outcome is contractible or not). However, in contrast to Hypotheses 3(i) and
3(iii), when e¤ort is a hidden action, the expected total surplus levels are signif-
icantly larger if communication is possible (regardless of whether the outcome
is contractible or not).
HA vs. V A HAC vs. V AC HA  vs. V A  HA C vs. V A
 
C
Contract vs. no contract 1.000 1.000 0.316 0.362
High e¤ort vs. low e¤ort 0.025 0.386 0.000 0.006
High e¤. vs. low e¤./no contr. 0.041 0.287 0.000 0.024
Exp. surplus 0.0501 0.4318 0.0000 0.0479
Principals exp. prot 0.8329 0.6579 0.0000 0.0077
Agents exp. prot 0.0152 0.9843 0.5963 0.2729
Exp. prots (high e¤.) 0.0215 0.9203 0.0151 0.1501
Prots (low e¤.) 0.5500 0.1197 0.4261 0.3085
Rounds 0.4371 0.4813 0.0529 0.7433
Table 3. The e¤ect of e¤ort veriability.
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HA vs. HA  V A vs. V A  HAC vs. HA C V AC vs. V A
 
C
Contract vs. no contract 0.316 1.000 1.000 0.362
High e¤ort vs. low e¤ort 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.035
High e¤. vs. low e¤./no contr. 0.000 0.337 0.000 0.016
Exp. surplus 0.0000 0.2676 0.0000 0.0098
Principals exp. prot 0.0000 0.0150 0.0114 0.4414
Agents exp. prot 0.0707 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000
Exp. prots (high e¤.) 0.2951 0.0000 0.0231 0.0001
Prots (low e¤.) 0.3248 0.7073 0.8074 0.0904
Rounds 0.0469 0.0020 0.3741 0.6442
Table 4. The e¤ect of outcome contractibility.
HA vs. HAC V A vs. V AC HA  vs. HA C V A
  vs. V A C
Contract vs. no contract 0.117 0.617 0.031 1.000
High e¤ort vs. low e¤ort 0.102 0.755 0.000 0.811
High e¤. vs. low e¤./no contr. 0.041 0.574 0.000 0.663
Exp. surplus 0.0258 0.3727 0.0000 0.5507
Principals exp. prot 0.9690 0.6636 0.0032 0.1410
Agents exp. prot 0.0019 0.6755 0.0211 0.2475
Exp. prots (high e¤.) 0.0072 0.8308 0.2875 0.0986
Prots (low e¤.) 0.3727 0.2434 0.5326 0.5953
Rounds 0.1215 0.1052 0.0068 0.0001
Table 5. The e¤ect of communication.
Note that the expected total surplus levels result from the contract versus
no contract decision and the chosen e¤ort level in case a contract was signed.
According to agency theory, a contract should always be signed in all treat-
ments, so there should be no di¤erences between the treatments in this regard.
Indeed, in eleven out of the twelve pairwise comparisons in Tables 3, 4, and 5,
we do not nd a signicant di¤erence regarding the contract versus no contract
decision. Only when we compare the HA  treatment to HA C , we nd a statis-
tically signicant di¤erence. This di¤erence is in line with the fact that in HA C
communication is very often used in a clarifying way (see Section 5.2.2. below),
thus making it less likely that the players fail to agree on a contract.
In the three tables, we also provide p-values for pairwise comparisons of the
treatments with regard to the fraction of high e¤ort provided that a contract
is signed and the fraction of high e¤ort among all observations. Note that we
nd a signicant di¤erence between two treatments regarding the expected total
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surplus levels whenever there is a signicant di¤erence regarding the fraction of
high e¤ort among all observations.29
Taken together, contract theory with risk-neutral preferences correctly pre-
dicts the most frequently chosen e¤ort level in each of our eight treatments.
While thus the theory clearly provides a useful organizing framework for our
data, there are non-negligible deviations. In the next section, we therefore take
a closer look at the data and analyze the negotiated contracts in more detail.
5.2 A closer look at the data
5.2.1 Incentive compatibility
Figure 1 shows the distributions of the contracts (X; Y ) on which the players
agreed in the treatments with contractible outcomes. In the treatments where
e¤ort is a hidden action, the blue circles depict the cases in which the agent
chose high e¤ort, while the red triangles depict the cases in which the agent
chose low e¤ort. Note that in the treatments with veriable e¤ort, only the
cases in which the players contractually specied high e¤ort are shown (since
otherwise the contract contained only a single wage Z).
The gure illustrates that the contract-theoretic considerations are indeed
useful to organize the data. Consider rst the benchmark treatments with
veriable e¤ort. Recall that each player gets 5 when no contract is signed.
Now suppose a contract is signed which species high e¤ort. In this case, the
agents expected payo¤ is 5
6
Y + 1
6
X   4 and the principals expected payo¤
is 5
6
(26   Y ) + 1
6
(14   X). Thus, a contract must lie above the orange line
(Y = 54
5
  1
5
X) to satisfy the agents participation constraint and it must lie
below the green line (Y = 114
5
  1
5
X) to satisfy the principals participation con-
straint. The yellow line (Y = 84
5
  1
5
X) depicts the contracts which yield the
same expected payo¤s for principal and agent.30 Recall that standard theory
predicts that risk-neutral players with equal bargaining powers will agree on
high e¤ort and choose a wage pair that lies on the yellow curve.
29In eleven out of the twelve comparisons, the fractions of high e¤ort given that a contract
is signed di¤er between two treatments whenever the expected total surplus levels di¤er.
Comparing the HA and HAC treatments, we nd no signicant di¤erence in the fractions of
high e¤ort given that a contract was signed, while the expected total surplus levels (which are
also inuenced by the contract vs. no contract decisions) di¤er signicantly.
30Note that if a contract is signed that species low e¤ort, the agents and the principals
participation constraints are satised if Z is larger than 5 and smaller than 9, and Z = 7
would yield equal payo¤s.
18
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
Low effort High effort
IC PC agent
PC principal Equal exp. payoffs
HA
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
High effort
PC agent PC principal
Equal exp. payoffs
VA
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
Low effort High effort
IC PC agent
PC principal Equal exp. payoffs
HAC
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
High effort
PC agent PC principal
Equal exp. payoffs
VAC
  
 
Figure 1. The distributions of the agreed-upon contracts (X;Y ) in the treat-
ments with contractible outcomes. In each treatment, the size of the symbol is
proportional to the relative frequency of the respective contract. The panels of
the treatments with veriable e¤ort show only those cases in which the players
agreed on high e¤ort. In the cases in which the players agreed on low e¤ort, in
the treatment V A the wages were Z = 7 (four times), Z = 6 (one time), and
Z = 10 (one time), while in the treatment V AC the wages were Z = 7 (three
times), Z = 4 (one time), and Z = 6 (one time).
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Observe that almost all observations in the treatments V A and V AC satisfy
both playersparticipation constraints.31 In both treatments, the by far most
frequently observed contract species high e¤ort and the wage pair X = 9,
Y = 15, which lies on the yellow curve.32
Now consider the treatments in which e¤ort is a hidden action. The agents
expected payo¤when he exerts high e¤ort (5
6
Y + 1
6
X 4) is larger than his payo¤
when he exerts low e¤ort (X) whenever the incentive compatibility constraint
Y  X + 24=5 is satised. Thus, standard theory predicts that risk-neutral
agents choose high e¤ort for contracts above the black curve (Y = X + 24
5
)
and low e¤ort for contracts below the black curve. Given this behavior, above
the incentive compatibility curve the participation constraints and the contracts
yielding equal expected payo¤s are still depicted by the same curves as in the
panels showing the treatments with veriable actions. Below the incentive com-
patibility curve, when low e¤ort is chosen, the principals participation constraint
is satised left of the green curve (X = 9), the agents participation constraint
is satised right of the orange curve (X = 5), and equal payo¤s are attained
by contracts on the yellow curve (X = 7). Recall that standard theory predicts
that risk-neutral players with equal bargaining powers will agree on contracts
that lie above the black curve and on the yellow curve.
Consider the HA treatment. As is illustrated in the upper left panel of
Figure 1, 32 of the 43 agreed-upon contracts (74:4%) satised the incentive
compatibility constraint. If the incentive compatibility constraint was satised,
the agents chose high e¤ort in the vast majority of the cases (27=32 = 84:4%).
If the incentive compatibility constraint was not satised, then the agents chose
low e¤ort in 10 out of the 11 cases (90:9%).33 The most frequently observed
contract was X = 7, Y = 15, which was made in 9=43 = 20:9% of the cases,
followed by the contract X = 9, Y = 15, which was made in 4=43 = 9:3% of the
cases.
31In particular, in V A the participation constraints are always satised except in one case
where the parties specied low e¤ort and agreed on Z = 10. In V AC , a participation constraint
was violated in only three cases when the parties specied high e¤ort and in one case when
they specied low e¤ort.
32When the parties agreed on high e¤ort, the contract X = 9, Y = 15 was chosen in
23=38 = 60:5% of the cases in V A and in 24=41 = 58:5% of the cases in V AC .
33Regarding the 32 incentive compatible contracts, the agents participation constraint was
always satised and the principals participation constraint was satised in 31 cases. With
regard to the 11 contracts that were not incentive-compatible, the agents participation con-
straint was satised in 10 cases, while the principals participation constraint was satised in
8 cases.
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Next, consider the HAC treatment. As can be seen in the lower left panel of
Figure 1, the incentive-compatibility constraint was satised in 41=47 = 87:2%
of the cases. Given incentive compatibility, 38=41 = 92:7% of the agents chose
high e¤ort. If the incentive compatibility constraint was not satised, the agents
always chose low e¤ort.34 The most frequently observed contract was X = 9,
Y = 15, which was chosen in 15=47 = 31:9% of the cases, followed by X = 7,
Y = 15, which was chosen in 12=47 = 25:5% of the cases.
Hence, regarding the contract execution stage, the agentsbehavior in both
treatments with hidden action clearly indicates that the concept of incentive
compatibility has strong predictive power. With regard to the contract negoti-
ation stage, we observe that in both treatments the two most frequently chosen
contracts lie above the black curve and on or very close to the yellow curve,
conrming the prediction that standard theory makes for risk-neutral players
with equal bargaining powers.
5.2.2 Content of the communication protocols
We employed two undergraduate students at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne
to independently classify all chats in the communication treatments according
to predened categories.35 The students did not participate in the experiment
and were not informed about the research questions addressed in our study. De-
pending on the treatment, there were ve to eight categories (see Table 6).36
For each category, the coders could mark either yesor no. Table 6 shows
the relative frequencies with which the coders marked yes.
Coding is subjective and the coders do not always agree on the message
classication. In Table 6, we thus provide for each category Cohens kappa
(Cohen, 1960; Krippendor¤, 2004), which takes a value of 0 when the amount
of agreement is what random chance would imply, and 1 when the coders agree
perfectly. Kappa values between 0:41 and 0:60 are often considered moderate
agreement, while those above 0:60 indicate substantialagreement (see Landis
34Note that the relevant participation constraints were satised by all contracts with the
exception of only one contract which was not incentive compatible and violated the principals
participation constraint.
35Our content analysis methodology thus follows Cason et al. (2012) and Cason and Mui
(2015).
36See Appendix B for a more detailed description of the categories. Note that Brandts et
al. (2016) have also used the categories friendliness, clarication, and promise in their content
analysis.
21
and Koch, 1977). Observe that some kappa values are very low.37 Following
Cason et al. (2012), we exclude from the further analysis all cases where kappa
is smaller than 0.3, and we note that the cases in which kappa is between 0.3
and 0.4 should be interpreted with caution.
HAC V AC
yes kappa yes kappa
Friendliness 65:96% 0:541 63:83% 0:728
Clarication 61:70% 0:735 64:89% 0:860
Incentive comp. 39:36% 0:356
Distrib. Fairness 53:19% 0:187 48:94% 0:374
Reciprocity 21:28% 0:215
Promise 38:30% 0:730
Threat 2:13% 1:000 3:19% 0:657
Risk 30:85% 0:265 12:77% 0:624
HA C V A
 
C
yes kappa yes kappa
Friendliness 62:50% 0:364 54:17% 0:667
Clarication 79:17% 0:625 59:38% 0:784
Distrib. Fairness 51:04% 0:265 52:08% 0:440
Reciprocity 52:08% 0:833
Promise 27:08% 0:684
Threat 8:33% 0:458 17:71% 0:645
Risk 29:17% 0:600 38:54% 0:449
Table 6. For each treatment and each chat category, the table displays the
relative frequency with which the coders marked yes(agreement resulted in a
value of 0 if no one marked yesor in a value of 1 if both coders marked yes,
while disagreement between the coders resulted in a value of 0.5). The table also
shows Cohenss kappa, a measure of agreement between the coders.
Table 7 shows the relative frequencies with which the coders marked yes
in the cases in which high e¤ort was chosen, compared to the cases in which
either low e¤ort was chosen or no contract was signed. For example, consider
friendliness. In the treatment HAC the relative frequency of friendly chats was
37For instance, in the category distributive fairness one of the coders has marked yesonly
when fairness was explicitly mentioned, while the other coder also marked yes when the
players mentioned something like equal prots. Also in some cases regarding reciprocity
and risk, one coder took the denitions more literally, while the other coder seems to have
interpreted the texts more freely.
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75% in the cases in which high e¤ort was chosen, while it was less than 28% in
the other cases. As shown in Table 7, the di¤erence is statistically signicant.
Observe that also in the treatmentHA C the coders considered signicantly more
chats to be friendly in the cases in which high e¤ort was chosen. In contrast, in
the treatments with veriable e¤ort the di¤erences are not signicant.
We will come back to the content analysis in the following three subsections,
where we analyze in more detail the deviations from the theoretical predictions
that we have found in Section 5.1.
HAC V AC
high e¤ort no high e¤ort p-value high e¤ort no high e¤ort p-value
Friendliness 75:00% 27:78% 0:005 66:67% 40:00% 0:250
Clarication 75:00% 5:56% 0:000 69:05% 30:00% 0:064
Incentive comp. 48:68% 0:00% 0:001
Distrib. Fairness 51:19% 30:00% 0:272
Reciprocity
Promise 43:42% 16:67% 0:115
Threat 2:63% 0:00% 0:627 3:57% 0:00% 0:622
Risk 14:29% 0:00% 0:291
HA C V A
 
C
high e¤ort no high e¤ort p-value high e¤ort no high e¤ort p-value
Friendliness 78:95% 51:72% 0:021 57:81% 46:88% 0:461
Clarication 86:84% 74:14% 0:344 68:75% 40:63% 0:043
Distrib. Fairness 56:25% 43:75% 0:341
Reciprocity 89:47% 27:59% 0:000
Promise 65:79% 1:72% 0:000
Threat 0:00% 13:79% 0:036 15:63% 21:88% 0:710
Risk 42:11% 20:69% 0:074 48:44% 18:75% 0:015
Table 7. For each treatment and each chat category, the table displays the
relative frequencies with which the coders marked yes in the cases in which
high e¤ort was chosen and in the cases in which e¤ort was low or no contract
was signed. The table also shows the corresponding p-values. Note that the
cases in which Cohens kappa was below the reliability threshold of 0.3 have
been excluded.
5.2.3 Strategic uncertainty and communication
While the majority of the agents in the HA treatment chose high e¤ort, we
nd that (in contrast to the theoretical prediction assuming risk-neutrality)
the fraction of high e¤ort in HA is signicantly smaller than in V A. As a
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consequence, in contrast to Hypothesis 1(i) the expected total surplus is smaller
in HA than in V A.
The di¤erence between HA and V A can be explained by the presence of
strategic uncertainty in the contract execution stage of the HA treatment. In
V A, once the contract has been negotiated, there are no further actions to be
taken by a player. In contrast, in the contract execution stage of HA, the agent
must choose between high and low e¤ort. Even when the parties have agreed
on an incentive-compatible contract, the principal may have doubts whether the
agent will actually choose high e¤ort (since the agent may make mistakes or have
non-standard preferences). Recall that there is no signicant di¤erence between
HAC and V AC .38 Indeed, communication may well reduce strategic uncertainty.
In particular, while in the absence of communication the principal may doubt
whether the agent has understood that a contract is incentive-compatible, in
the presence of communication the agent can clarify that given an incentive-
compatible contract it is in his own self-interest to exert high e¤ort.
The content analysis in Table 7 shows for the HAC treatment that in the
cases in which high e¤ort was chosen the chat indeed was classied as containing
clarication signicantly more often than in the cases in which this was not the
case.39 Similarly, inHAC the coders marked the category incentive compatibility
in almost half of the cases in which high e¤ort was chosen, while this category
was never marked otherwise.
These observations are in line with Table 5. There can be no strategic uncer-
tainty in the veriable action treatments, so communication has no e¤ect when
we compare V A and V AC . Yet, communication can reduce strategic uncertainty
when e¤ort is a hidden action, and as a consequence the expected total surplus
is signicantly larger in HAC than in HA, which is in contrast to Hypothesis
3(i).
Recall that in the control treatments with veriable actions the contract
specifying high e¤ort and the wages X = 9, Y = 15 is agreed upon in the
majority of the cases. Given high e¤ort, these wages always lead to the same
payo¤s for both players and thus expose both players to the same amount of
risk. While X = 9, Y = 15 are also the most frequently chosen wages in HAC ,
38Note that the di¤erence between HA and V A cannot be explained by risk-aversion, since
there is no signicant di¤erence between HAC and V AC and the players risk-aversion is
independent of whether or not there is communication.
39In Appendix B we provide two illustrative chat examples for each communication treat-
ment. The examples for the HAC treatment show how communication is used to clarify that
the agent has an incentive to exert high e¤ort and that there should be no doubt he will
actually do so.
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the players agree on these wages signicantly less often in HA (p-value = 0:010),
whereX = 7, Y = 15 is the most frequently chosen contract. This nding can be
attributed to the fact that compared to the contractX = 9, Y = 15, the contract
X = 7, Y = 15 provides the agent with stronger incentives and moreover it leads
to equal payo¤s when the agent chooses low e¤ort, which the principal may fear
in the presence of strategic uncertainty. When communication is possible, the
agent can remove these doubts and clarify that it is individually rational for him
to exert high e¤ort given the wages X = 9, Y = 15.40
5.2.4 Non-contractible outcome and ex post payo¤s
Figure 2 shows the distributions of the contracts on which the players agreed in
the treatments with non-contractible outcomes. The panels on the left side illus-
trate the negotiated wages X and the subsequent e¤ort decisions by the agents
in the treatments where e¤ort was a hidden action. The panels on the right side
illustrate the treatments where the e¤ort level was veriable. Thus, these panels
show the wages Z that were negotiated when the parties contractually specied
low e¤ort and the wages X that were negotiated when the parties agreed on
high e¤ort.
40Note that these considerations are in line with the fact that the agentsexpected prots
are smaller in HA than in HAC (while they do not di¤er signicantly between V A and V AC).
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Figure 2. The distributions of the agreed-upon contracts in the treatments
with non-contractible outcomes. In the hidden action treatments, the color of
the bars indicates for each wage X the e¤ort level that was chosen by the agents.
In the veriable action treatments, the green bars illustrate the frequencies of
the wages Z on which the parties agreed when they contractually specied low
e¤ort, while the blue bars show the frequencies of the wages X on which the
parties agreed when they specied high e¤ort.
Observe that in the treatments where e¤ort is a hidden action, the by far
most frequently negotiated contract was X = 7 (this wage was agreed upon in
20=40 = 50% of the cases in HA  and in 17=47 = 36:2% of the cases in HA C),
which is in line with the theoretical prediction.
In the treatments where e¤ort is veriable, the two most frequently negoti-
ated contracts either specied high e¤ort and X = 12 or low e¤ort and Z = 7.41
41Specically, high e¤ort and X = 12 was chosen in 11=44 = 25% of the cases in V A  and
in 9=44 = 20:5% of the cases in V A C , while low e¤ort and Z = 7 was chosen in 8=44 = 18:2%
of the cases in V A  and in 11=44 = 25% of the cases in V A C .
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Recall that according to standard theory, risk-neutral players with equal bar-
gaining powers would agree on high e¤ort and X = 14, which yields the same
expected payo¤ of 10 for both parties. The fact that the players often agree
on contracts that specify high e¤ort and wages smaller than X = 14 can be
explained if the principal is risk-averse and hence is willing to bear all the risk
only if she obtains a risk premium. Moreover, contracts that specify low e¤ort
can be rationalized when the principals are very risk-averse.
Indeed, comparing the veriable action treatments with and without con-
tractible outcomes, we nd that in the former case (where the players can share
the risk) high e¤ort is contractually specied more often than in the latter case
(where the principal has to bear the full risk), though the di¤erence is statisti-
cally signicant only when communication is possible. In contrast to Hypothesis
2(iv), the expected total surplus is thus larger in V AC than in V A C . Observe
that in line with this explanation, the content analysis shows that in V AC the
players talk about risk only in 12:77% of the cases, while in V A C they do so in
38:54% of the cases (see Table 6).42
5.2.5 Non-contractible outcome and communication
When we compare the wages X on which the players agreed in the HA  treat-
ment with the wages Z on which the players agreed in the benchmark treat-
ment V A  if they specied low e¤ort, we nd no signicant di¤erence (p-value
= 0:2534). In the HA  treatment, when the wage is negotiated, the vast ma-
jority of the players obviously proceeds on the assumption that in the contract
execution stage the agent will choose low e¤ort. In contrast, the wages on which
the players agree in HA C are signicantly di¤erent from the wages on which the
players agree in V A C when low e¤ort is specied (p-value = 0:0038) as well as
from the wages on which the players agree in V A C when high e¤ort is specied
(p-value = 0:0028).
Specically, while in HA C we nd that X = 7 is the most frequently agreed-
upon wage, the players agree on wages X  10 in 25=47 = 53:2% of the cases,
which often leads the agent to choose high e¤ort. In line with the literature on
gift exchange, the fraction of agents that choose high e¤ort is increasing in the
wage.43 Comparing the treatments HA  and HA C , we see that communication
42The chat examples for the V A C treatment provided in Appendix B illustrate that the
principal is often willing to agree on high e¤ort and to bear the full risk only if her expected
payo¤ is larger than the agents payo¤.
43In particular, when X = 10, X = 11, X = 12, X = 13, and X = 14, respectively, then the
fractions of high e¤ort are 2=4 = 50%, 2=3 = 66:7%, 3=4 = 75%, 4=5 = 80%, and 8=9 = 88:9%.
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leads the players to agree on wages X  10 much more often.44 As a conse-
quence, in contrast to Hypothesis 3(iii) the expected total surplus is larger in
HA C than in HA
 .
Our content analysis shows that in the treatment HA C a promise was made
in around 2/3 of the cases in which high e¤ort was chosen, while in the other
cases a promise was almost never made (see Table 7). Similarly, the players
explicitly talked about reciprocity signicantly more often in the cases in which
high e¤ort was chosen. In contrast, note that the relative frequency of promises
does not di¤er signicantly between the cases with and without high e¤ort in
the treatment HAC , where the outcome was contractible so that the players
could write incentive-compatible contracts.
In line with Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), the e¤ect of communication
when outcome is non-contractible can be explained if agents experience a utility
loss due to guilt when they let down the principal by breaking their promise
to choose high e¤ort. Note that reciprocity alone cannot explain the deviations
from standard theory that we observe in HA C , because otherwise we should
observe similar deviations inHA .45 However, inHA  the players agree on large
wages only very rarely. Analyzing the contract negotiation stage, we actually
nd that even when the agents make a contract o¤er, there are hardly any cases
in which they propose a wage of X = 14 (implicitly suggesting that they will
exert high e¤ort), while in most cases they propose relatively small wages (thus
making it quite clear that they plan to exert low e¤ort).46
Recall that in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) the wage is exogenously
xed to X = 14, and they nd that communication increases the fraction of
cases in which the contract is signed and high e¤ort is chosen. In contrast, we
allow the players to endogenously negotiate the wage and we nd that when
communication is possible the players agree on larger wages than in the absence
of communication. Hence we identify an additional channel through which com-
munication works in the hidden action problem.
44In the treatment HA , the players agree on wages X  10 in only 9=40 = 22:5% of the
cases.
45Recall that there are only two e¤ort levels, hence even in the absence of communication
it is obvious which e¤ort decision the principal expects from the agent when they agree on a
high wage.
46See Figure A4 in the Appendix.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have experimentally studied a one-shot principal-agent problem
explicitly designed to capture the essence of moral hazard as it is usually treated
in contract theory. It has turned out that contract theory indeed provides a
useful organizing framework and correctly predicts the most frequently taken
e¤ort decision in each treatment.
However, some of our results cannot be explained by standard theory. In
particular, communication turns out to be very helpful. When the principals
return is contractible, then in line with contract theory the parties can typi-
cally overcome the hidden action problem by agreeing on incentive-compatible
contracts. Yet, even in this case communication is useful, since it can reduce
strategic uncertainty. Moreover, when the principals return is her private in-
formation, such that contracts cannot be outcome-contingent, then in line with
contract theory in most cases high e¤ort is agreed upon when e¤ort is veriable,
while low e¤ort is chosen when e¤ort is a hidden action. Yet, the severe problem
caused by the unobservability of the agents e¤ort is substantially reduced when
communication is possible. Thus, our experiment illustrates that it is desirable
to further enrich moral hazard theory to contribute to a better understanding
of real human behavior.
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Appendix
A. The contract negotiation stage
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Figure A1. For each treatment, the gure shows the distribution of the number
of rounds taken in the contract negotiation stage until an agreement was reached
or the negotiation was terminated. As one might have expected, in the treat-
ments in which preplay communication was possible we observe smaller numbers
of negotiation rounds than in the respective no-communication treatments (how-
ever, the di¤erence is signicant only in the case of non-contractible outcomes;
cf. Table 5). Moreover, note that in the absence of communication, when the
outcome was non-contractible the negotiations took signicantly more time than
when the outcome was contractible (cf. Table 4).
30
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
Principal's offer, rej. Principal's offer, acc.
Agent's offer, rej. Agent's offer, acc.
IC PC agent
PC principal Equal exp. payoffs
HA
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
Principal's offer, rej. Principal's offer, acc.
Agent's offer, rej. Agent's offer, acc.
PC agent PC principal
Equal exp. payoffs
VA
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
Principal's offer, rej. Principal's offer, acc.
Agent's offer, rej. Agent's offer, acc.
IC PC agent
PC principal Equal exp. payoffs
HAC
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
Y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
X
Principal's offer, rej. Principal's offer, acc.
Agent's offer, rej. Agent's offer, acc.
PC agent PC principal
Equal exp. payoffs
VAC
  
Figure A2. The gure depicts the distributions of the wage o¤ers (X;Y ) that
were made in the contract negotiation stage in the treatments with contractible
outcomes and indicates whether the respective o¤er was accepted or rejected by
the other party. In each treatment, the size of the symbol is proportional to
the relative frequency of the respective o¤er. Recall that in the hidden action
treatments the e¤ort level chosen by the agent when the contract was accepted is
shown in Figure 1. Note that the panels of the treatments with veriable e¤ort
show only the wages that were proposed in combination with high e¤ort (see
Figure A3 for the wages o¤ered in combination with low e¤ort).
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Figure A3. For the treatments with veriable e¤ort and contractible outcomes,
the gure shows the distributions of the wage o¤ers Z that were made when low
e¤ort was proposed in the contract negotiation stage. The gure also indicates
whether the respective o¤er was accepted or rejected by the other party.
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Figure A4. For the treatments with non-contractible outcomes, the gure
displays the distributions of the wage o¤ers that were made in the contract
negotiation stage and shows whether the respective o¤er was accepted or rejected
by the other party. Recall that in the hidden action treatments the contract
consists only of a wage X (the e¤ort level chosen by the agent when the contract
was accepted is shown in Figure 2), while in the veriable action treatments a
contract o¤er either species high e¤ort and a wageX or low e¤ort and a wage Z.
33
B. Examples of free-form communication
We now provide illustrative examples of the contents of the free-form commu-
nication. Recall that in the experiment, we used a neutral framing (principals
are called player A,agents are called player B,high e¤ort is called roll the
die,and low e¤ort is called dont roll the die). In each example, we report
how the chat was classied by the two coders. Descriptions of the categories are
provided in Table B1.
Friendliness
The tone (i.e., the atmosphere) of the conversation is friendly (e.g.,
use of greetings and smileys).
Clarication
A player explains something to another player (e.g., how the payo¤s
are calculated or why a specic behavior is in a players interest).
Incentive comp.
A player points out that given specic payments, it is in player Bs
self-interest to roll the die (i.e., player B is better o¤ by doing so).
Distrib. Fairness
A player mentions that a specic contracts leads to a fair distribution
of the prots, or that it is impossible to achieve a fair distribution.
Reciprocity
A player mentions that if they agree on specic payments, fairness
requires that subsequently player B will roll the die.
Promise
Player B makes a promise to roll the die (possibly conditional on
an agreement on specic payments).
Threat
A player makes a threat (e.g., not to roll the die or to break o¤ the
negotiations).
Risk
A player mentions that specic behavior involves a risk or that it is
impossible to divide the risk evenly between the players.
Table B1. Two coders independently classied the conversations according to the categories
displayed in the table.
Hidden action treatment HAC
 Session 1, group 1. The coders both marked yesin the categories Friendliness, Clar-
ication, Promise, and noin the categories Reciprocity, Threat.
Preplay communication:
Player A: I choose X = 7, so we both obtain 7 if you choose dont roll the die.And
Y = 15, if you then choose roll the die (which is the best decision for both of us),
there is a 5=6 probability that we both obtain 11 euro.
Player B: Hello :-). I agree with Y , but not with X. I will denitely choose to roll the
die. I expect that also for X you choose the amount which leads to the same result for
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both of us. So, X = 9 and Y = 15. For me it does not make much sense not to roll the
die, because 5=6 is a pretty high probability... It would be good if we take the decision
Y = 15 and X = 9 immediately in the rst round.
Player A: Though I cannot trust you! Because here one can trust nobody, but if you
really think economically in your own interest, you should then choose to roll the die,
because then you have the good ! chance to get 11 euro. I choose X = 9 and Y = 15.
Player A proposes X = 9, Y = 15 in the rst round of the negotiations and adds the
message: Lets then hope for a 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er and chooses roll.
 Session 1, group 8. The coders both marked yesin the categories Friendliness, Clar-
ication, Incentive Comp., and noin the categories Promise, Threat.
Preplay communication:
Player A: Hello. I would propose a contract X = 6 and Y = 15. When rolling the die
the probability is quite high so a prot of 11 for EACH of us should be great and we
would make the same prots!
Player B: Hi, I think your o¤er is quite good already, but I would choose X = 9,
because if I then decide to roll the die so that hopefully each of us obtains 11 ECU,
both of us would obtain 5 ECU in case the die after all comes up 1.
Player A: Hi! If you dont roll the die, you get X = 9 and I get 5 ECU... That makes
no sense! Because then your incentive to roll the die is quite low. My o¤er: Y = 15, as
before, X = 7! You can roll the die, then the probability is high that both of us get 11
ECU, or both of us get 7 ECU. Given a probability of 1=6, I expect that this scenario
will not occur!
Player B: You have to trust in your fellow humans a little more ;-), but it is okay, we
will do it this way! X = 7 and Y = 15.
Player A proposes X = 7, Y = 15 in the rst round of the negotiations and adds the
message: Oh well, with trust I have never had a good experience in experiments :-),
but okay, we agree on X = 7 and Y = 15. I have entered it now :-).
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er and chooses roll.
Veriable action treatment V AC
 Session 1, group 7. The coders both marked yesin the categories Friendliness, Clar-
ication, and noin the categories Threat, Risk.
Preplay communication:
Player B: Well. No contract negotiated means 5 ECU -> bad. Not rolling the die given
a value of 7 means 7 for both of us -> better, but still bad. We should roll the die, with
values X = 9 and Y = 15. There is the little probability that both of us then get only
5 ECU each, but the probability is higher that both of us get 11 ECU and that would
be the best result. Agreed?
Player A: Yes, of course, sounds good, so we roll the die with the values that you have
proposed.
Player B: Exactly. X = 9 and Y = 15. Good luck for us! ;-) Let us begin the contract
negotiations.
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Player A proposes X = 9, Y = 15 and the action roll the die in the rst round of
the negotiations and adds the message: Everything okay given this contract? :-)
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er.
 Session 2, group 2. The coders both marked yesin the categories Friendliness, Clar-
ication, and noin the categories Threat, Risk.
Preplay communication:
Player A: Well, my proposal is: Action roll the die, X = 9 (then both of us obtain only
5 ECUs, but the probability of this is only 1=6), and Y = 15, (then both of us get 11
ECU with the probability 5=6. If we did not roll the die we could at most get 7 if I
take Z = 7). Hence, I think the rst proposal is much better :P What do you say :) ?
Player B: O.k., we can do this.
Player A proposes X = 9, Y = 15 and the action roll the diein the rst round of the
negotiations and adds the message: Perfect. Then keep your ngers crossed that the
die comes up correctly.
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er.
Hidden action with non-contractible outcome treatment HA C
 Session 1, group 10. The coders both marked yes in the categories Friendliness,
Clarication, Reciprocity, Promise, and noin the categories Threat, Risk.
Preplay communication:
Player B: Good morning, teammate :) Just to clarify, so that it doesnt take us unnec-
essarily many negotiation rounds (in case you want to negotiate at all). Below 10 ECU
a contract makes no sense. Then I can take 5 ECUs which one gets without a contract.
Starting with 12 ECU in the contract I would roll the die, then both of us prot from
this (except in case of a 1, but a 1 is not very likely). Kind regards
Player A: If you really roll the die, I will even start with 13 ECU. Agreed?
Player B: Agreed, its a deal!
Player A proposes X = 13 in the rst round of the negotiations and adds the message:
Great ;-)
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er and chooses roll.
 Session 1, group 13. The coders both marked yes in the categories Friendliness,
Clarication, Reciprocity, Risk, and noin the categories Promise, Threat.
Preplay communication:
Player A: I suppose that you understand the experiment. I propose that we agree on a
number and then choose to roll the die and hope that the 5=6 probability materializes.
For the largest prot, 14 is optimal. But I propose 12, so I still get something in case
the 1=6 probability materializes. You would then get 8 plus 5. :)
Player B: Its all clear to me ;) I dont fully agree with 12. What about 13? Then you
would still get something if the 1=6 probability materializes. After all, I rather prefer
not to roll the die, because then I would get more anyway ;)
Player A: Then we agree on 7 and dont roll the die. Then both of us get 7.
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Player B: Hmm. Then 12 would be better, of course ;)
Player A: I prefer 7 ;), just to make sure. And we are through quickly.
Player B: 10?
Player A: 7 or 5. Your call.
Player B: O.k., then 7.
Player A proposes X = 7 in the rst round of the negotiations and adds the message:
Good :)
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er and chooses dont roll.
Veriable action with non-contractible outcome treatment V A C
 Session 2, group 15. The coders both marked yes in the categories Clarication,
Distrib. Fairness, and noin the categories Friendliness, Threat.
Preplay communication:
Player A: I would prefer the action roll the diewith the number X = 10, since for
you the prots are always the same, my payo¤ however depends on the number the die
shows and it would thus be either 4 ECU or 16 ECU.
Player B: The probability 5=6 is higher. Hence I would like to choose X = 12. Thus I
would obtain more and it is relatively unlikely that the die comes up 1. In the end the
payo¤s would be fairer.
Player A proposes X = 12 and the action roll the die in the rst round of the
negotiations.
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er.
 Session 3, group 1. The coders both marked yesin the categories Friendliness, Clar-
ication, Distrib. Fairness, Risk, and noin the category Threat.
Preplay communication:
Player A: The chance to get more money in case of the contract roll the die is
denitely higher. Do you agree to chose this contract variant so that both of us have
the chance to get more money?
Player B: Yes, absolutely!!!
Player A: Perfect!! So far, we agree. Since the number of rounds reduces the amount
of money, we should sign the contract immediately in round 1. To make it fair, I would
choose X such that ideally both of us obtain more money than in case of not rolling
the die. Do you also agree with this?
Player B: Yes, I would have proposed the same. Which X do you propose?
Player A: Since in the bad scenario when the die comes up 1 we obtain the same payo¤s
and since it is relatively fair I would propose X = 9 as a compromise. Do you agree?
Player B: Given your proposal, we would better choose not to roll the die and Z = 7.
Rolling the die makes sense only if we take a larger X. I would have proposed X = 12
or X = 13.
Player A: Yes, but in case of X = 12 or X = 13, I lose much more when the die comes
up 1 than when we choose the fair case not to roll the die, Z = 7. Then I would not
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get 7, but only 1 or 2 ECU! I have to bear this risk. Hence, Im willing to agree on
X = 11 at most, so that it pays o¤.
Player B: O.k.
Player A proposes X = 11 and the action roll the die in the rst round of the
negotiations.
Player B immediately accepts the o¤er.
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The Supplementary Material contains the experimental instructions for all of our eight treatments. 
The following table illustrates how the treatments differ from each other. 
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Instructions for the treatment HA  
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of two numbers X and Y. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. The negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
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• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the two numbers X and Y are fixed.  
The experiment then proceeds as follows:  
 
Player B takes one of the actions “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
  
Player A does not learn whether player B chooses “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.”  
 
 
• If player B chooses “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X  ECU  
 
 
• If player B chooses “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll of a die that is  
   simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - Y  ECU 
   Player B:  Y - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X and Y are integers and that do not lead to a negative profit for a  
    player in any case can be proposed.  
  
 
Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
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Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise 
your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the 
identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, 
too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
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Instructions for the treatment VA 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of  
• either the action “roll the die” and two numbers X and Y 
• or the action “don’t roll the die” and a number Z. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. The negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
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            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - Z  ECU 
   Player B:   Z  ECU  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll  
   of a die that is simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - Y  ECU 
   Player B:  Y - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X and Y, resp. Z, are integers and that do not lead to a negative  
    profit for a player in any case can be proposed.  
  
 
Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
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Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note:  
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise 
your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the 
identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, 
too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
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Instructions for the treatment HAC 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
To begin with, player A and player B who are assigned to one another can alternatingly send each 
other text messages via the computer. Hereafter, the first stage of the experiment starts.  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of two numbers X and Y. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. A text message can be added to the contract offer. The 
negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
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• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the two numbers X and Y are fixed.  
The experiment then proceeds as follows:  
 
Player B takes one of the actions “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
  
Player A does not learn whether player B chooses “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
 
 
• If player B chooses “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X  ECU  
 
 
• If player B chooses “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll of a die that is  
   simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - Y  ECU 
   Player B:  Y - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X and Y are integers and that do not lead to a negative profit for a  
    player in any case can be proposed.  
 
 Each text message can contain a free-form text with up to 500 characters. Any hints regarding  
    your identity (e.g., name, cabin number, cloths, etc.) are not allowed.  
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Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
 
Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed except through the experimental 
software. If you have a question, please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are 
anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a person who has made a particular 
decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff 
of another participant is.  
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Instructions for the treatment VAC 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
To begin with, player A and player B who are assigned to one another can alternatingly send each 
other text messages via the computer. Hereafter, the first stage of the experiment starts.  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of  
• either the action “roll the die” and two numbers X and Y 
• or the action “don’t roll the die” and a number Z. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. A text message can be added to the contract offer. The 
negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
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• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - Z  ECU 
   Player B:   Z  ECU  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll  
   of a die that is simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - Y  ECU 
   Player B:  Y - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X and Y, resp. Z, are integers and that do not lead to a negative  
    profit for a player in any case can be proposed.  
 
 Each text message can contain a free-form text with up to 500 characters. Any hints regarding  
    your identity (e.g., name, cabin number, cloths, etc.) are not allowed.  
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Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
 
Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note:  
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed except through the experimental 
software. If you have a question, please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are 
anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a person who has made a particular 
decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff 
of another participant is. 
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Instructions for the treatment HA
 
_
 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of a number X. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. The negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
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• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the number X is fixed.  The experiment 
then proceeds as follows:  
 
Player B takes one of the actions “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
  
Player A does not learn whether player B chooses “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
 
 
• If player B chooses “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X  ECU  
 
 
• If player B chooses “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll of a die that is  
   simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - X  ECU 
   Player B:  X - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X is an integer and that do not lead to a negative profit for a  
    player in any case can be proposed.  
  
 
Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
xvi 
 
 
Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise 
your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the 
identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, 
too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
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Instructions for the treatment VA
 
_
 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of  
• either the action “roll the die” and a number X  
• or the action “don’t roll the die” and a number Z. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. The negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
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            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract. The negotiation then 
proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - Z  ECU 
   Player B:   Z  ECU  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll  
   of a die that is simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - X  ECU 
   Player B:  X - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X and Z are integers and that do not lead to a negative profit for a  
    player in any case can be proposed.  
  
 
Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
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Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise 
your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the 
identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, 
too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
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Instructions for the treatment HAC
_
 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
To begin with, player A and player B who are assigned to one another can alternatingly send each 
other text messages via the computer. Hereafter, the first stage of the experiment starts.  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of a number X. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. A text message can be added to the contract offer. The 
negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
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• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the number X is fixed.  The experiment 
then proceeds as follows:  
 
Player B takes one of the actions “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
  
Player A does not learn whether player B chooses “roll the die” or “don’t roll the die.” 
 
 
• If player B chooses “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X  ECU  
 
 
• If player B chooses “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll of a die that is  
   simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - X  ECU 
   Player B:  X - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X is an integer and that do not lead to a negative profit for a  
    player in any case can be proposed.  
 
 Each text message can contain a free-form text with up to 500 characters. Any hints regarding  
    your identity (e.g., name, cabin number, cloths, etc.) are not allowed.  
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Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
 
Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed except through the experimental 
software. If you have a question, please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are 
anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a person who has made a particular 
decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff 
of another participant is.  
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Instructions for the treatment VAC
_
 
 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
In this experiment always two participants interact with each other. You will be randomly 
assigned either to the role of player A or to the role of player B.  
 
The currency in the experiment is called ECU (“Experimental Currency Unit”).  
 
To begin with, player A and player B who are assigned to one another can alternatingly send each 
other text messages via the computer. Hereafter, the first stage of the experiment starts.  
 
 
First stage: Contract negotiation 
 
In the first stage, the two players can agree on a contract.  
 
A contract consists of  
• either the action “roll the die” and a number X  
• or the action “don’t roll the die” and a number Z. 
 
First, player A proposes a contract. A text message can be added to the contract offer. The 
negotiation then proceeds as follows:  
 
 
Round 1:  
 
Player B learns which contract player A has proposed. Player B then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player B accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
      
• Player B rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player B rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
Round 2:  
 
Player A learns which contract player B has proposed. Player A then takes one of the following 
decisions:  
 
• Player A accepts the contract. The contract negotiation then is finished and the second 
stage of the experiment is reached.  
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• Player A rejects the contract and does not propose a different contract. The experiment is 
terminated, i.e. the second stage is not reached. In this case, the profits are:  
 
            Player A:  5  ECU 
            Player B:  5  ECU 
 
• Player A rejects the contract and proposes a different contract (a text message can be 
added to the contract offer). The negotiation then proceeds with the next round.  
 
 
If round 3 (resp., 5, 7, 9, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 1.  
 
If round 4 (resp., 6, 8, 10, ...) takes place, this round proceeds in analogy to round 2.  
 
 
Second stage: Roll or don’t roll a die 
 
If in the first stage a proposed contract has been accepted, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “don’t roll the die,” the profits are as follows:  
 
   Player A:  14 - Z  ECU 
   Player B:   Z  ECU  
 
 
• If the contract prescribes the action “roll the die,” the profits depend on the outcome of the roll  
   of a die that is simulated by the computer:   
 
   With probability 1/6, the die comes up 1. Then the profits are:  
 
   Player A:  14 - X  ECU 
   Player B:   X - 4  ECU  
 
   With probability 5/6, the die comes up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Then the profits are: 
 
   Player A:  26 - X  ECU 
   Player B:  X - 4  ECU  
 
 
Please note:  
 The experiment takes place only once, there are no repetitions. Please take your time to think  
    carefully about what you want to do.       
 
 Only such contracts where X and Z are integers and that do not lead to a negative profit for a  
    player in any case can be proposed.  
 
 Each text message can contain a free-form text with up to 500 characters. Any hints regarding  
    your identity (e.g., name, cabin number, cloths, etc.) are not allowed.  
 
  
Your payoff: 
The profit made in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash. The exchange rate is as 
follows: One ECU corresponds to 0,99R Euro, where R is the number of rounds that have taken 
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place in the first stage. Thus, the fewer rounds have taken place in the first stage, the more 
favorable is the exchange rate for you: 1 ECU = 0,99 Euro in case of one round, 1 ECU ≈ 0,98 
Euro in case of two rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,97 Euro in case of three rounds, 1 ECU ≈ 0,96 Euro in 
case of four rounds, and so on.  
 
Additionally, you obtain 5 Euro for your participation. At the end of the experiment, we kindly 
ask you to answer a questionnaire.  
 
 
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed except through the experimental 
software. If you have a question, please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are 
anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a person who has made a particular 
decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff 
of another participant is.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
